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Abstract
Daniels, Porteny and Urrutia et al make a good case for the idea that that public decisions ought to be made not 
only “in the light of ” evidence but also “on the basis of ” budget impact, financial protection and equity. Health 
technology assessment (HTA) should, they say, be accordingly expanded to consider matters additional to safety 
and cost-effectiveness. They also complain that most HTA reports fail to develop ethical arguments and generally 
do not even mention ethical issues. This comment argues that some of these defects are more apparent than real and 
are not inherent in HTA – as distinct from being common characteristics found in poorly conducted HTAs. More 
generally, HTA does not need “extension” since (1) ethical issues are already embedded in HTA processes, not least in 
their scoping phases, and (2) HTA processes are already sufficiently flexible to accommodate evidence about a wide 
range of factors, and will not need fundamental change in order to accommodate the new forms of decision-relevant 
evidence about distributional impact and financial protection that are now starting to emerge. HTA and related 
techniques are there to support decision-makers who have authority to make decisions. Analysts like us are there to 
support and advise them (and not to assume the responsibilities for which they, and not we, are accountable). The 
required quality in HTA then becomes its effectiveness as a means of addressing the issues of concern to decision-
makers. What is also required is adherence by competent analysts to a standard template of good analytical practice. 
The competencies include not merely those of the usual disciplines (particularly biostatistics, cognitive psychology, 
health economics, epidemiology, and ethics) but also the imaginative and interpersonal skills for exploring the “real” 
question behind the decision-maker’s brief (actual or postulated) and eliciting the social values that necessarily 
pervade the entire analysis. The product of such exploration defines the authoritative scope of an HTA.
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Health technology assessment (HTA) can be seen as a form of policy research,1 as a culturally specific construct2 as a source of good evidence3 or, as I shall 
suggest, as a decision-making process that is embedded in 
further public and professional policy processes.
Daniels, Porteny and Urrutia (henceforth DPU)3 make a 
good case for the idea that public decisions ought to be made 
not only “in the light of ” evidence but also “on the basis of ” 
budget impact, financial protection and equity. HTA[1] should 
accordingly, they say, be expanded to consider matters other 
than safety and cost-effectiveness[2]. The phrases in quotation 
marks imply the necessity for conversation and deliberation 
amongst the deciders or their advisers. However, “most HTA 
reports … fail to develop ethical arguments and generally 
do not even mention ethical issues” [p. 1],3 a view shared by 
others.6,7 At this (quantitative) point about “most” papers, a 
paper by Hoffman8 is cited which does not, unfortunately, state 
what a “HTA report” is and certainly does not cite or count 
any. If this is a reference to reports on technology assessments 
conducted by the likes of the National Institute of Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE)[3] in England and Wales, it seems 
inaccurate as well as unfair, for NICE scopes its appraisals 
conscientiously, lays bare its social value judgments and 
has considerable public participation – all of which provide 
ample opportunity for ethical discussion. If it is a comment 
on specific journal articles dealing with the effectiveness or 
aspects of the cost-effectiveness of an intervention, it depends 
on whether the intention of the authors (or of those who 
commissioned the research in question) was to provide a 
broadly-based assessment and whether the study had any 
ethical content. Typically, such studies are partial and are 
sometimes exceedingly partial (for example, concerned 
exclusively with clinical efficacy). It is scarcely surprising, 
and hardly to be objected to, that a study does not address 
what it does not seek to address. It is the process of evidence 
assimilation and interpretation, along with the application of 
contextual judgments of both fact and value, which constitutes 
the assessment. An item of evidence, or a specific calculation 
(as in a specific algorithm), is but one input into the process 
and may have no ethical content as such or, if it has, may be 
well-enough comprehended by the cognoscenti for it to need 
no explicit mention. 
Let us distinguish algorithms and processes. Both contain 
evidence. Both often also contain value judgments about 
what is good science, good ethics and about what is good 
for society. An algorithm specifies a series of calculations 
with given parameters that generates a quantitative result or 
output. The quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) is an example 
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In a rece t article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative nderpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception f politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We comme  the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global alth nd gree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health research “driven by crises, hot issues, and 
the concerns of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to move away from,” Ooms is submitting to a liberal 
conception of politics he implicitly criticizes the outcomes 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized h w underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions
through which an orde  is created, organizing human
coexistence in the ontext of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a topic needs to be contested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘they’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social relations is partial and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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of an algorithm. HTA is better seen as a process through 
which evidence is gathered and appraised for quality and 
relevance, checked against criteria and where some of the 
parameters and structural characteristics of the calculation 
may themselves be up for discussion and decision[4]. Plainly, 
it is possible to conduct an exercise which might be entitled 
“HTA” entirely in a research environment and with little or 
no direct interaction with any actual social decision-maker. 
This might especially be true if one were engaged in advocacy. 
But such exercises would lack authority (where would the 
value and other judgments embodied in the analysis have 
come from?) and may also lack relevance (how sure can one 
be that the problem tackled is one that engages the attention 
of decision-makers?). Such an approach pushes HTA in an 
algorithmic direction – and may result in the conclusions of 
the analysis being ignored. DPU would probably agree that 
HTA is a process and moreover that it is one that is itself 
nested in a wider political and professional set of processes: 
their opening paragraph refers to HTA as “one good source of 
evidence.” Where the edges of the issues and their resolution 
are assigned – within the HTA process or the broader one – is 
hardly a fixed line of demarcation. In many cases, the HTA 
process is embodied in an agency which in turn has a place 
in a wider decision-making and policy context. I imagine that 
in most cases the constitution and governance arrangements 
define the nature of the decisions or recommendations made 
by the agency and hence their authority and its accountability. 
Analysts have two main tasks in relation to processes. One is 
to design a satisfactory process – for example, one meeting the 
requirements of “accountability for reasonableness.”9 It is not 
necessary – indeed it is unethical – to prescribe all the specific 
ethical judgments that may have to be made. That is not the 
job of analysts but of decision-makers and their advisers. The 
design job of analysts is to create a framework which ensures 
that all relevant, quantitatively and ethically significant issues 
can be considered by decision-makers and their advisers. This 
may often be usefully accomplished by direct challenges by 
analysts, enablers and others who organise the process and 
this, in turn, is a major advantage of a deliberative process 
over algorithms. The ethical views of analysts as to what is 
good for society are not, however, of interest. Their proper 
skill lies in eliciting decision-makers’ values not in asserting 
their own. Such a process is part of the scoping of an HTA.
The other job of analysts is to populate the HTA process 
with ideas and evidence. A well-designed process will 
also surface specific matters of ethics (or epidemiology, or 
economics) for explicit consideration, whether or not they 
are submitted in the package of evidence. It is unnecessary 
for ethical (epidemiological, economic, etc) matters to be 
raised that embody established principles or whose treatment 
is stipulated. Decision-makers may have already determined 
that a particular outcome measure be employed within a 
specific jurisdiction, or that a particular discount rate be used. 
There may be ethical considerations involved, and in making 
such rulings, all relevant ethical matters ought to have been 
borne in mind, but there is no expectation that they would 
be constantly revisited - though unusual or innovative ideas 
and evidence should be specifically addressed and ideally 
reported. Checks might be made that the assumptions, for 
example about the outcome measure, are indeed applicable 
in the case under consideration – a good reason for having 
patient representatives engaged in the process. 
The extent to which DPU’s claimed failure of HTA to address 
ethical issues is inherent in HTA or the result of poor 
application or poor reporting is unclear. The apparent failure 
may simply be based upon a reading of a wrong part of the 
literature. Moreover, regarding the more granular components 
of an HTA process, such as the estimation of a price elasticity, 
there may be no ethical content at all. Most HTA reports may 
indeed not develop ethical arguments or mention ethical 
issues but whether this is a “failure” is less clear.
The ethical underpinnings of economic evaluation are 
readily available in dozens of economics textbooks on welfare 
economics; they fall into two main categories: welfarist and 
extra-welfarist,10 which differ markedly in the treatment and 
ethical content of both algorithms and processes, but which 
are hardly trade secrets. It is, or should be, well-known that 
major value assumptions are built into the algorithm known 
as the QALY (EQ-5D style and its variations) which include 
principles for the selection of dimensions, scaling them and 
weighting them. There is a huge literature covering all these 
aspects. It is excessive to demand that these elements be 
routinely exposed in all applications of the algorithm. Some 
competencies have to be assumed in the readership. 
The Reference Case
A “Reference Case”[5] is a good example of a set of decision 
principles for a technology assessment. The NICE in England 
and Wales developed its own Reference Case12 and in the 
Methods for Economic Evaluation Project,13,14 the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation sponsored the development of 
a more comprehensive standard-setting Reference Case 
for HTAs and similar exercises conducted as a part of its 
programmes. This is being further developed for international 
use by the International Decision Support Initiative of NICE 
International and the Health Intervention and Technology 
Assessment Program (HITAP) in Thailand. Its 11 principles, 
to which it is hard to do brief justice, all entail explicitly 
ethical elements: transparency, selection of comparators, 
use of evidence, outcome measures, cost measures, time 
horizons, costs and effects outside health, heterogeneity (eg, 
population subgroups), uncertainty, impact on budgets and 
other constraints, equity and social justice. 
What is of ethical significance is often contextual. For example, 
the value of the financial protection afforded by provision of a 
new intervention in societies where healthcare is either free of 
charge or subject to minor charges with many exemptions for 
the needy, may not be affected in any way by the introduction 
of a new technology. Where that is not true (for example, 
where the new intervention may be accompanied by a new 
user charge) such a valuation may be judged[6] to be needed – 
but technical (and ethical) guidance on how to estimate it is 
only now being developed. Rarely considered is the financial 
consequence, and how it is to be reckoned, when interventions 
are deemed to be cost-ineffective and provided only in the 
private sector to those willing to pay. Similarly contextual 
is the “perspective” to be adopted. This will typically be 
determined by political authorities (whose accountability is to 
the public[7]) so the perspective adopted in studies to support 
public decision-making may, therefore, not be a matter for the 
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discretion of the analysts or researchers.15 Ethicists may then 
search in vain for a discussion of the ethics of the perspective. 
A Reference Case militates against bad practice; standard-
setting and guides to good practice can have impact[8]. 
Frequently what is wrong is not the tool but its users or the 
environment that may constrain their proper use of it. Further 
solutions might lie in more thorough training in normative 
economics and related subjects, including moral philosophy. 
A good training in pharmacy or epidemiology with a few ad 
hoc courses in welfare economics, HTA and medical ethics 
will not do.
There is a notable lack of practical ethical tools for use in 
decision-making contexts.16,17 The incorporation of health 
equity into HTA through the development of new algorithms 
and process design has, however, advanced in recent years18-24 
having been much impeded in the past by a multiplicity of 
ill-formulated concepts and values and a lack of a widely 
accepted normative source on which to build controversial 
choices. Research programmes are fortunately progressing in 
tackling the substantial theoretical and empirical difficulties 
in quantifying equity and financial impacts in ways suitable 
for integration in decision-making.25-27
Efficiency and Ethics
DPU argue that “[s]ometimes reducing the unfair distribution 
of health in a population … should be given priority over 
making a health system more efficient (eg, by pursuing what 
is most cost-effective to maximize health)” [p1].3 This seems 
eminently reasonable but is actually problematic on grounds 
of the implied meaning of “efficiency.” The difficulty is rooted 
in the idea of “population health.” Somehow the “healths” of 
all the individuals in question have to be added up to find 
the total and the shares. But how should this be done? If our 
measure of health were the QALY, one might simply sum 
QALYs, thereby implicitly assigning a uniform weight to each. 
But that would be to build in a very specific distributional 
value judgment and doing so will almost inevitably result 
in a clash with ideas of interpersonal equity, most of which 
entail assigning higher weights to those who are deprived, 
have shorter life expectancies, or who have lower capacities to 
benefit from healthcare. It is better to understand efficiency 
as “being cost-effective”: ie, seeking to achieve any given 
distribution of outcomes at the lowest opportunity cost 
(the cost being again an appropriately weighted sum of 
the health gain lost through the proposed prioritisation). 
The false trade-off may arise from an inappropriate use of 
the economists’ concept of “allocative” efficiency, which 
characterises an alleged optimal allocation of outcomes across 
individuals according to marginal willingnesses to pay and 
which locates a specific distribution on the health frontier28: 
one that is almost certainly inequitable on most criteria of 
equity. Replacing one inequitable rule for determining the 
ideal position on the health frontier with an arbitrary other 
will not do. It is better to stick with the idea of “productive” 
efficiency (ie, cost-effectiveness) and explicitly lay out the 
principles for selecting the equitable allocation. In this way, 
there is no conflict between efficiency and equity, and minds 
can then be focused on the variety of ethical desiderata that 
vie for attention but cannot simultaneously be fully achieved, 
partly because of resource limitations (including limited 
information) and partly because the ethical desiderata 
often conflict. The false dichotomy between efficiency and 
equity is made worse by propositions such as “equity trumps 
efficiency.”28-30 In both cases, the contribution of efficiency to 
human welfare is denigrated.
The Competence of Health Technology Assessment 
DPU are concerned that HTA might exceed its competence. 
An example is given of a situation in which a decision might 
hinge on non-quantified considerations. The implication 
is that HTA rests solely on quantified evidence and that it, 
therefore, needs to be embedded in a “fair, deliberative” 
process so that the other considerations may be brought to 
bear. But quantified evidence has never been the “base” on 
which “evidence-based” decisions are taken that is why 
the term “evidence-informed” decision-making is much 
to be preferred. Some of the evidence fed into the process, 
like cost-effectiveness studies, may be quantitative; other 
evidence may be qualitative. It will all be of variable quality 
and relevance, which must be judged. Some critical evidence 
will be missing. Some will be no more than opinion. The 
object of the process is to enable consideration of all types 
and to reach a credible and defensible judgment. DPU 
underline an important characteristic of a decision-making 
process, which is “legitimacy.” This requires “accountability 
for reasonableness” but also more. A good decision process 
involves its participants in deliberation. New ethical issues 
immediately arise: who should participate? Does participation 
also involve decision-making power? Are all participants to 
have equally influential roles? At what stages of the process 
do they participate? Do different participants participate at 
different stages? Do participating patient representatives 
agree that the QALYs used in the research evidence are 
adequate indicators of benefit for the purposes in hand? Do 
physician partners agree that the evidence on efficacy can 
reasonably be extended to effectiveness? In such ways, the 
process itself may reveal evidence that was previously lacking. 
To see HTA as a process for collective thinking, or a complex 
of processes and subprocesses (like having a selection panel 
to identify stakeholders) to support the thinking process, 
greatly enhances accountability, legitimacy, and credibility. 
The more complete it is the more accountability, legitimacy 
and credibility are enhanced.
Envoi
Two cheers only for DPU. They get some important things 
right. They are right to deplore shoddy practical analyses 
that uncritically embody dubious ethics (whether embodied 
in efficiency or distributive questions); they are right to 
advocate deliberative methods of social decision-making; 
they are right in that there is a way to go before some of 
the “broader” questions (especially of equity and financial 
protection) can be routinely and quantitatively embodied in 
processes of HTA. But their view that HTA reports “do not 
even mention ethical issues” is naïve: some reports contain no 
ethics; some are the outcome of many years of ethical enquiry, 
a litany of which is not needed; some ethical questions are 
not up for discussion in HTA, being settled by the sponsors 
of the process; and some are laid on the table by a good 
Reference Case for explicit discussion. Our focus as academic 
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analysts ought to be on the design of competent processes, the 
training of competent analysts, the education of competent 
commissioners and users of HTA, the competent briefing of 
the public and professional media, and enabling the intelligent 
interpretation of HTA results by those who implement them 
– the healthcare professionals – and those on whose behalf 
HTA is done – the public.
So, should HTA reports really start to provide explicit 
quantitative information about budget impact, distributional 
impact, and financial protection impact? It depends on the 
context and whether these are important considerations for 
decision-makers. Reports may not need to include information 
about financial protection impact when such impacts are 
small, as is usually the case in high income countries with 
universal health systems and relatively generous systems of 
social protection. Nor need they tediously rehearse the ethics 
of HTA when the ethics are already embedded in processes. 
They probably do more often need to address health 
distributional issues in all jurisdictions. But one size will not 
fit all. What works well for the United Kingdom may not be 
right for South Africa. 
Does HTA need “extension”? No – but specific studies (and so 
their reports) may sometimes need it badly!
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Endnotes
[1] HTA is one of a variety of forms of economic evaluation. Culyer et al4 
mockingly list 19 synonyms or near-synonyms for this form of analysis.
[2] They include efficacy as a criterion. I have omitted it on the grounds that 
something cannot be cost-effective if it is not efficacious – or, come to that, 
effective, in the conventional senses of “efficacy” and “effectiveness” for 
example as defined in.5
[3] NICE publishes reports of its health technology appraisals in three version, 
for HTA experts, clinicians and the public.
[4] An accessible account of a sophisticated HTA process in middle-income 
country (Thailand) is.4 
[5] Whose prototype was the product of a panel including our lead author.11
[6] By those with accountability: the “decision-makers.”
[7] It does not follow that the perspective it will adopt is or ought to be the so-
called “societal” perspective.
[8] A recent Thai study (K. Kittrongsiri, U. Chaikledaew, unpublished data) 
revealed both the careless methodological treatment prevailing in HTA studies 
done in Thailand prior to the issue of guidance standards in 2008 and the 
substantial impact on the quality of studies of HTA guidelines subsequently.
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